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In the Czech Republic, the COVID-19 crisis has brought not only a general state
of chaos but also a considerable shift of powers to the executive branch. The first
shift, impairing the legislative branch, was triggered by the declaration of a state of
emergency on 12 March 2020. The second shift, diminishing also the role of the
judiciary, was caused by a ruling in which the Constitutional showed its unwillingness
to interfere with the government’s steps. In this blogpost, I will first describe some of
the crisis measures adopted in Czechia, then I will describe the constitutional and
legal framework, including the judicial reaction to the situation, and finally, I will zoom
in on some of the issues that could cause problems in the near future.
1. An overview of (selected) restrictive measures
COVID-19 became a real issue in the Czech Republic on 1 March 2020 when
the Minister of Health confirmed the first three cases of the disease on the Czech
territory. In the following days, the Ministry of Health suspended flights to and from
South Korea and the north of Italy in order to prevent the spread of the disease
from unsafe areas. To the disappointment of many sport fans, the State Security
Council banned public participation at the World Cup Biathlon on 5-8 March 2020.
Other public events were still being held but the organisers newly had to notify the
regional hygiene station in advance of any event with participation of 5000+ persons.
A couple of days later, the Ministry of Health ordered all those returning from Italy to
stay at home for 14 days. Apart from these restrictions, life went on as usual.
Then, as a swift reaction to the growing concerns, on 10 March the Ministry of
Health prohibited events with 100+ participants and banned all teaching in primary,
secondary and tertiary educational institutions with effect from the following day. (I
was actually on my way to class when I read the news – and while I still taught a
seminar on Tuesday afternoon, my evening seminars no longer took place.) Two
days later, the government declared a state of emergency and the Ministry of Health
banned events with 30+ participants, closed gyms, swimming pools, music clubs,
libraries, galleries, and much more. As of 14 March, the government closed shops
and restaurants, with the exception of grocery stores, pharmacies, and some other
shops.
On Monday 16 March the government shut the borders and significantly limited
movement within the national territory. While foreigners were not allowed to enter the
country, citizens and long-term residents were not allowed to leave it. Any movement
was prohibited, except journeys to and from work, journeys to medical facilities,
family visits, and other inevitable journeys. As of 19 March, everyone had to cover
their mouth and nose whenever they left home, and persons below the age of 65
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could not enter grocery stores between 10-12am. (This rule changed twice within
less than a week, first to 7-9am, then to 8-10am, leaving everyone utterly confused.)
Between 12 March and 12 May the government issued 65 resolutions titled
‘government resolution on the adoption of a crisis measure’ (and a couple more
‘on the annulment of a crisis measure’), while the Ministry of health adopted
further measures. During these two months, members of the government held
frequent press conferences, drowning the inhabitants in a hypertrophy of legal rules,
exceptions, and exceptions from the exceptions. This led the country to a state of
surrender: after the people realised the state was not going to supply the promised
face masks, everyone sat down to sew their own masks and in the meantime tried
hard to keep up with the ever-changing rules and restrictions, hoping not to get fined
for missing the latest TV updates.
At the beginning of April, the government started to modify some of the restrictions
to make them more reasonable, e.g. allowing a limited operation of accommodation
facilities, allowing individual consultations at universities or allowing outdoor sports
without face masks. The rhetoric of ‘allowing’ certain activities raised a wave of
(well-founded!) criticism: in a liberal democracy, the government should not allow
things, but rather lift the restrictions. (While some will perceive this as a pointless
linguistic distinction, those who remember the previous regime will be sensitive to the
difference.) The month of April also brought three crucial judicial interventions. On
1 April the Supreme Administrative Court ruled that the government acted ultra vires
when it annulled by-elections to the Senate (the upper chamber of the Parliament)
which were to take place at the end of March. On 23 April, the Municipal Court in
Prague annulled some of the restrictive measures issued by the Ministry of Health
and emphasised that they should have been adopted by the government instead.
Conversely, the Constitutional Court refused to annul the declaration of the state of
emergency and the follow-up crisis measures, all for procedural reasons.
As of 11 May, the government started to lift the restrictions. People can now visit
a hairdresser, get a massage, go to church or visit a museum, and restaurants have
reopened their outdoor areas. The state of emergency ended on Sunday 17 May and
further liberating steps are to be taken at the end of May when restaurants should
open their indoor areas, hotels can fully resume their operation, schools plan to
resume some of their activities (on a voluntary basis, mostly), and people should be
able to visit ZOOs and castles and even get a tattoo (while, of course, wearing their
face masks); all of this with an important reservation: if the epidemiological situation
allows.
2. Constitutional framework, state of emergency and
various types of crisis measures
The Czech constitutional framework distinguishes three extraordinary states: a
‘state of war’ (the only one foreseen by the Constitution itself), a ‘state of threat
(to state sovereignty)’ and a ‘state of emergency’. All three are governed by the
Constitutional Act on the Security of the Czech Republic (110/1998 Coll., ‘CAS’).
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Of the three extraordinary states, the state of emergency is the most appropriate
(although not entirely apt) for a pandemic. A state of emergency can be declared
by the government for a period of maximum 30 days in order to protect lives and
health of people, among other reasons. The Chamber of Deputies (i.e. the lower
chamber of the Parliament) may annul the government’s decision to declare a state
of emergency, and any further extension of the state of emergency requires the
approval of the Chamber of Deputies.
On 12 March 2020 the government declared a state of emergency in the entire
national territory for a period of 30 days. This state of emergency was later
prolonged on 9 April and again on 30 April, in both cases by a government resolution
following prior approval of the Chamber of Deputies, as required by the CAS. At the
beginning of May the government announced it was not going to ask for any further
extension; the state of emergency thus ended on 17 May.
The constitutional framework of the state of emergency is brief; the relevant details
are laid down in the Crisis Management Act (240/2000 Coll., ‘CMA’) which specifies
the rights that can be limited by the executive in a state of emergency (Art. 5),
including the freedom of movement, the right to free assembly, and the right to
conduct business. All of these can only be restricted for a limited period of time and
‘to the extent unavoidably required to react to the situation’.
The most significant consequence of the state of emergency is the shift of powers
in favour of the executive. Under ordinary circumstances, fundamental rights and
freedoms may only be limited by an act of Parliament (Art. 4 of the Charter) but a
state of emergency empowers the government alone to restrict rights and freedoms
enumerated in the CMA. In line with Art. 6 of the CMA, the government is authorised
to order measures, e.g. prohibit entry, stay and movement of people in specified
places, or protect national borders. The most important limit is embedded in Art. 2
of the Constitution, pursuant to which ‘state authority may be asserted only in cases
and within the bounds provided for by law and only in the manner prescribed by law’.
Therefore, even in a state of emergency, the government cannot impose restrictions
which are not foreseen by the CMA and cannot interfere with fundamental rights not
enumerated in the CMA.
Next to the government acting pursuant to the CMA, other state authorities can also
intervene in situations of an epidemic on the basis of another legal act, the Act on
the Protection of Public Health (258/2000 Coll., ‘APPH’) which gives the Ministry of
Health (and other state authorities) powers to adopt measures in order to prevent
the spread of an epidemic. Although the legal order gives no indication as to the
formal relationship between crisis measures adopted pursuant to the CMA and
those adopted pursuant to the APPH, there are two crucial differences. First, while
the government’s powers under the CMA are strictly linked to crisis situations, the
powers of the Ministry under the APPH are not linked to an official declaration of a
state of emergency. Second, the two regimes differ considerably when it comes to
damages claims: while measures adopted pursuant to the APPH have to be unlawful
to give rise to damages, the CMA promises in Art. 36 to compensate everyone who
has suffered damage in connection with crisis measures adopted pursuant to this
act. In this context, it should be pointed out that the government annulled some
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of its resolutions originally passed under the CMA and the Ministry consequently
adopted the very same rules under the APPH, possibly hoping to avoid some of
the damaging claims. However, the Municipal Court in Prague has ruled that in
a state of emergency, interventions by the government should take precedence over
interventions by the Ministry of Health:
‘The fact that the challenged measures were adopted by the Ministry
of Health, and not by the government, amounts to a breach of the
constitutional guarantees of division of powers. In the process of adopting
crisis measures pursuant to the Crisis Management Act, the government
is under a continuous supervision of the Chamber of Deputies. […] As
a result of adopting the challenged measures by the Ministry of Health
pursuant to the Act on the Protection of Public Health, such supervision by
the Chamber of Deputies was excluded. The [Ministry] has therefore limited
the constitutionally guaranteed power of the Chamber of Deputies.’ (para
152)
The quoted judgment gave the first signal that there is an important legal distinction
between measures taken by the government and those taken by the Ministry of
Health. Another indication was given by the Constitutional Court in its decision
published a couple of days later.
3. The review by the Constitutional Court (or the lack
thereof)
The government’s declaration of a state of emergency was challenged before the
Constitutional Court, together with a number of crisis measures adopted by the
government and by the Ministry of Health. The complaint was filed by an individual
who claimed that the challenged measures violated her right to free movement
guaranteed by Art. 14 of the Charter. She requested that the Constitutional Court
annul the declaration of the state of emergency as well as the crisis measures.
In a rather controversial decision (Pl. ÚS 8/20), the Constitutional Court dismissed all
the complainant’s claims for several procedural reasons. This was the pilot decision
of the Constitutional Court concerning the COVID-19 situation. On the same day, the
Court also dismissed a complaint challenging a resolution by which the government
limited the activity of municipal councils (which were to meet only in inevitable cases,
and their meetings were to be held online). When a municipal council member
challenged this resolution, his complaint was dismissed for lack of standing.  Many
more complaints have reached the Constitutional Court, four more were dismissed
on 5 May, others are still pending.
Why is the pilot decision of the Constitutional Court controversial? It shows a major
split of opinions – the ruling is supported by 8 of 15 judges, with 7 judges issuing
dissenting or concurring opinions, offering notably different legal positions and
thereby weakening the overall persuasiveness of the majority’s argumentation. In
summary, the majority decided: a) that the Constitutional Court lacks competence
to review the declaration of the state of emergency as such; and b) that the
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government’s resolutions can be directly challenged before the Constitutional
Courts only by privileged applicants, while the measures adopted by the Ministry of
Health can be challenged by individuals before administrative courts, not before the
Constitutional Court.
a) the state of emergency is not subject to review (lack of competence)
The Constitutional Court has concluded that it lacks competence to review the
declaration of a state of emergency for two reasons: first, the Constitution does not
foresee any procedure by which such a declaration could be reviewed by courts; and
second, such a declaration is an act of governing, i.e. a political act, not a legal act.
I do not consider the latter argument persuasive enough. The Slovak constitution, for
example, also foresees a state of emergency which is declared by the government
and which is political in its nature (Art. 119); yet, the constitutional court is authorised
to review the constitutionality of such a declaration (Art. 129(6)). Therefore, the
political nature of the declaration by itself does not suffice to exclude its judicial
review. In combination with the lack of a review procedure, the argument seems
somewhat stronger. Yet, the Court has taken two steps in its reasoning by which it
undermined the conclusion on its lack of competence.
First, the Constitutional Court added a very controversial exception to the rule it had
created:
The absence of judicial review of a declaration of a state of emergency is not
absolute and it is conceivable that under some circumstances the Constitutional
Court could (and should) assess, especially on the basis of a motion brought by
a political minority, whether a state of emergency was duly declared, whether it had
the intended constitutional effects, and decide on the legality or constitutionality of
the ensuing implementing measures […]. The Constitutional Court could annul the
act declaring a state of emergency if it were contrary to the fundamental principles of
a democratic state governed by the rule of law and if it amounted to a change in the
essential requirements of a democratic state governed by the rule of law. (para 27)
In other words, a declaration of the state of emergency cannot be reviewed by the
Constitutional Court, but if such a declaration conflicts with the so-called material
core of the Constitution (a concept similar to the eternity clause embedded in Art.
79(3) of the Grundgesetz) or with the state’s international obligations, the path to
judicial review can open up. I do not consider this argument persuasive, but it is not
the first time that the Constitutional Court has introduced a substantive exception to
a procedural rule. In fact, a very similar idea was introduced in a case (Pl. ÚS 4/13)
where the Court dismissed a challenge to the amnesty granted by president Václav
Klaus: the Court stated that it lacked competence to review an amnesty decision
but it reserved such a competence for future cases if an amnesty decision ever
conflicts with the material core of the Constitution. The obvious problem is the lack
of competence itself: if the Court truly lacks competence to review a certain act, how
can it suddenly become competent in extreme cases?
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Second, the Court engaged in a (very limited) review of constitutionality of the
challenged declaration when it observed that the declaration had a formal flaw and
proceeded to check whether that flaw amounted to unconstitutionality. Pursuant to
Art. 6(1) of the CAS, when the government declares a state of emergency, it should
at the same time
‘specify which rights prescribed in individual statutes shall, in conformity
with the Charter, be restricted, and to what extent, and which duties shall be
imposed, and to what extent’.
In the past, the government had always enumerated the rights in the same resolution
by which it declared a state of emergency. Yet, in response to COVID-19, the
government first declared a state of emergency (69/2020 Coll.) with a general
reference to the rights enumerated in the CMA, and only several hours later it
adopted five crisis measures in which it specified the individual restrictions. The
majority of the Constitutional Court has concluded that although the steps of the
government suffered from a formal shortcoming, they were not unconstitutional
since ‘an excessively strict assessment of the formal requirements would belittle the
severity and the exceptionality of the situation which had led to the declaration of the
state of emergency’ (para 29). To me, that sounds like a review of constitutionality
of the challenged declaration, namely of the process of its adoption, although the
standard of review was admittedly very weak.
b) government resolutions can only be directly challenged by privileged applicants
and measures of the Ministry are subject to review by administrative courts
As for the resolutions issued by the government pursuant to the CMA, the Court
analysed their legal nature and concluded that the challenged measures should
be classified as ‘other legal acts’. That means that although they are not ‘laws’ (i.e.
their legal force is lesser than the legal force of acts of Parliament), they are
nevertheless of general normative nature. Therefore, they cannot be directly (!)
challenged by natural or legal persons but solely by privileged applicants such as
the parliamentary opposition or the ombudsperson. Since the complainant has
not challenged a concrete interference with her rights, her motion to annul the
government’s resolutions cannot be considered by the Court. (Unlike the ECtHR, the
Czech Constitutional Court is convinced that legal acts as such can never amount to
an interference with fundamental rights.)
In contrast to government resolutions, measures issued by the Ministry of Health
are of a different legal nature and, as a result, they have a different procedural
status. According to the Constitutional Court, they take the form of ‘hybrid
measures’ (Allgemeinverfügungen in German, opat#ení obecné povahy in Czech),
i.e. a specific category of measures that are at the same time general in their
application (like acts of Parliament) but individual in their subject-matter (addressing
a specific issue, like administrative decisions). Such acts can be challenged before
administrative courts on condition that the complainant has been personally affected
by the challenged measure. The constitutional complaint was thus untimely, and the
Constitutional Court can only deal with it once the complainant has exhausted all
other available remedies in the administrative judiciary.
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Surprisingly, the Court argued differently in relation to measures that had already
been annulled by the executive branch. The Court concluded that since these
measures were no longer in effect, they could not be reviewed at all. This was
harshly criticised by some of the dissenting judges who emphasised that such a
conclusion could lead to a ‘procedural trap’ if the Ministry intentionally replaced
the challenged measures by new ones in order to preclude their judicial review.
This is the most surprising resignation of the Court, since the legal order does not
prevent the Constitutional Court from reviewing non-applicable legal acts (unlike
administrative courts).
4. Legal issues arising from the current situation
The current situation has triggered a number of interesting legal problems which will
have to be solved in the near future. Obviously, each of these is a problem of its own
which would deserve more than just a quick sketch.
a) legality and proportionality of the adopted measures
The pilot ruling of the Constitutional Court has clarified the procedural aspects of
reviewing crisis measures; yet, their substantive legality remains open to discussion.
The Municipal Court in Prague has set out some basic rules for their substantive
review, but many more cases are pending, and no measures have been annulled
for substantive reasons (so far). That does not mean that the executive enjoys
unlimited discretion. All crisis measures are subject to judicial review and their
legality depends on an appropriate legal basis as well as on their proportionality.
While some of the crisis measures are unproblematic, others raise doubts.
To mention a few examples, the complete ban on international travel could
be problematic both from the perspective of its legal basis (does the Czech
Republic even have competence to forbid its citizens to leave the country?) and its
proportionality (is it necessary in a democratic society to completely ban entry and
exit from a country if other countries allow travelling and impose a quarantine?), not
to mention their potential conflict with EU law. Those who understand Czech can
read Jan Wintr’s analyses of various measures on his webpage.
Another example which stirred public debate in the Czech Republic was the
complete prohibition of fathers’ presence during childbirth due to protection of health
of the medical personnel. After the ombudsman had infamously declared that the
presence of fathers is merely a fad, not a subjective right, this topic was widely
discussed by lawyers as well as by the general public and the Ministry of Health
eventually lifted this restriction. There are some pending cases, however, brought by
those whose rights have been restricted in the meantime.
b) discrepancy between the press conference and the written crisis measures
One blatant example of the utter regulatory confusion concerns the situation of
cross-border commuters. Their situation has changed a number of times, always
with a legal basis in some government resolution. However, the last change,
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announced during a press conference of the government, did not appear in any
of the published crisis measures. This results in an absurd situation in which the
government has announced a rule at a press conference and some persons follow
this rule on the basis of its publicity; yet, as has been pointed out by an attorney,
the rule itself does not appear in any of the published crisis measures. Similarly, the
state has launched an application for smartphones (eRouška) which complies with
the EU’s technical recommendations, yet, it completely lacks a proper legal basis or
any regulatory framework whatsoever.
c) the uncertainty about future claims for damages against the state
One of the biggest legal issues are (and will be!) the future claims for damages
brought against the state by those economically affected by the COVID-19 crisis. As
mentioned above, while the Ministry’s acts passed pursuant to the APPH would have
to be unlawful in order to trigger compensation mechanisms, the CMA promises
compensation to everyone who has suffered damage as a result of any crisis
measures, lawful or unlawful. Unsurprisingly, members of the government have
already indicated that the state is not planning to compensate all the losses incurred
by entrepreneurs in connection with the epidemic. The state will most probably
attempt to argue these cases on lack of causation, claiming that the losses were
incurred as a result of the epidemic, not of the crisis measures. This opens up an
opportunity for interesting (and possibly absurd) counterfactual claims and it remains
to be seen how the courts will tackle them.
d) the bigger picture: a European dimension?
A very sad circumstance of the COVID-19 crisis is that the Czech (legal) discourse
seems to be estranged from the European reality. The Czech Republic has not
derogated from its obligations pursuant to Art. 15 of the European Convention on
Human Rights, nor under other international treaties, and almost nothing has been
said on the European dimension of the crisis measures, on their (in)compatibility
with EU law and/or the Convention. On the contrary, the political discourse has
been shifting worryingly towards open declarations of protectionism and national
sovereignty, arguing that the past two months have shown that Europe is not
there when we need help, so we are better off on our own. It is not surprising
that members of the right-wing nationalist party keep emphasising that any crisis
measures should give preference to Czech workers, Czech entrepreneurs and
Czech products. What is more worrying, though, is a similar rhetoric by the Prime
minister, or the fact that the Chamber of Deputies is currently discussing a draft
piece of legislation which would oblige supermarkets to stock 60 % of groceries
produced by Czech producers, in order to boost sales of national agricultural
products. (Although this was not a direct reaction to COVID-19, it has been used in
recent discussions as an example of protectionism designed to help Czech actors
overcome the crisis.)
In the context of the recent developments, it is hard to tell which of the current crises
is the most dangerous for the liberal democracy which is becoming so fragile in
our part of the world. With the end of the state of emergency, the previously upset
balance of powers is gradually returning to normal, at least domestically. Still, many
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issues remain open and the legal, political, and economic consequences of the crisis
are yet to be seen.
In her capacity as judicial law clerk at the Constitutional Court, the author was not
involved in the drafting of the analysed decision.
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